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Reflections on the EU Third Country Regime for
Capital Markets in the Shadow of Brexit
by
NIAMH MOLONEY*
This article considers the recent evolution of the EU’s third country regime for capital market
access in light of Brexit, the important series of legislative reforms adopted in March 2019 as
the 2014-2019 European Parliament/Commission term closed, and the emergence of the Eur-
opean Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) as a material technocratic influence. The
article suggests that while the capital market third country regime is changing (with Brexit a
key but not exclusive driver of change), it is not being radically recast, although it is tighten-
ing. The regime remains broadly based on the more-or-less liberal ‘deference’ model which
has long characterised EU third-country financial services policy. But it is becoming increas-
ingly ‘on-shored’ by means of the direct application of EU rules and by ESMA’s oversight/
supervision of certain third country actors. The significantly more restrictive approach being
taken to third country central clearing counterparties is a marked development, but here the
political and economic context is distinct. The implications of the overall shift towards a more
‘on-shore’, centralised, and potentially restrictive access regime are considered, and a modest
reform prescription is offered.
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1. Introduction
The UK’s June 2016 decision to leave the EU has generated an extensive policy
debate and a burgeoning scholarly literature on the implications for EU capital
market regulation. The future of the Capital Markets Union (CMU) agenda in
the absence of the EU’s largest capital market, whether or not EU capital mar-
ket regulation will become more dirigiste,1 and how Member States’ interests
will be reshuffled in this key and frequently highly-contested area of EU reg-
ulatory policy are among the ‘big ticket’ issues to have been widely discussed.2
Attention has most often focused, however, on the EU’s third country capital-
market-access regime, how it will accommodate the UK as a systemically-sig-
nificant, off-shore, third country capital market, and whether the exigencies of
Brexit will drive wider change to the third country regime.3 This heightened
focus on market access arrangements is not unique to the EU. IOSCO is cur-
rently examining market access arrangements globally as the evidence of in-
creased capital market fragmentation in the wake of the crisis-era reforms ac-
1 As recently suggested by the Financial Times: Editorial, “UK Politicians must set out the
Future for Finance”, Financial Times, 18 November 2019.
2 From an extensive legal/political science literature see e.g.: Jakob Schemmel, “Regulating
European Financial Markets between Crisis and Brexit”, Journal of Financial Regulation
and Compliance 2019, DOI: 10.1108/JFRC-04-2018-0057;David Howarth/Lucia Qua-
glia, “Brexit and the Battle for Financial Services”, Journal of European Public Policy 25
(2018), 1118; David Howarth/Lucia Quaglia, “Brexit and the Single European Financial
Market”, Journal of Common Market Studies 55 (2018), 149; Scott James/Lucia Quaglia,
“The Brexit Negotiations and Financial Services: ATwo-Level Game Analysis”, The Po-
litical Quarterly 89 (2018), 560; Niamh Moloney, “Brexit and Financial Services: (yet)
another restructuring of EU institutional governance for financial services”, Common
Market Law Review 55 (2018), 175; Georg Ringe, “The Politics of Capital Markets Un-
ion”, ECGI Law Working Paper No 469/2019; and Niamh Moloney, “Bending to Uni-
formity: EU Financial Regulation with and without the UK”, Fordham International
Law Journal 40 (2017), 1335.
3 Elizabeth Howell, “Post-‘Brexit’ Financial Governance: Which Dispute Settlement Fra-
mework should be Utilised”, Modern Law Review 23 (2020), 128; Kern Alexander, The
UK’s Third Country Status Following Brexit: Post-Brexit models, third country equiva-
lence and Switzerland, in: Kern Alexander/Catherine Barnard/ Eilís Ferran/Andrew
Lang/Niamh Moloney, Brexit and Financial Services – Law and Policy, 2018, p. 115 et
seq;Henning Berger/Nikolai Badenhoop, “Financial Services and Brexit: Navigating To-
wards Future Market Access”, European Business Organisation Law Review 19 (2018),
679; Niamh Moloney, Capital Markets Union, Third Countries, and Equivalence: Law,
Markets and Brexit, in: Danny Busch/Emilios Avgouleas/Guido Ferrarini (eds.), Capital
Markets Union in Europe, 2018, p. 97 et seq; John Armour, “Brexit and Financial Ser-
vices”, Oxford Journal of Economic Policy 33 (2017), (Supp 1), S54; and Eilís Ferran,
“The UK as a Third Country in EU Financial Services Regulation”, Journal of Financial
Regulation 3 (2017), 40.
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cumulates.4 But while a host of influences and interests drive market access
discussions in the EU,5 it is clear that the 2016 Brexit decision, and the related
implications for the EU’s pivotal CMU agenda, can be strongly associated with
the EU’s recent focus on its previously somewhat arcane and often overlooked
third country arrangements. Since 2016, the EU’s future approach to the UK as
a third country has become clearer but in addition several measures reforming
the third country regime have been adopted under the umbrella of the CMU
agenda. These developments require consideration and contextualisation.
Alongside, there have been material technocratic developments related to but
independent of Brexit. Specifically, the European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA) has become actively engaged with the third country re-
gime, and an EU appetite for conferring additional powers on ESMA in this
area has emerged. The nature of ESMA’s growing influence on the third coun-
try regime accordingly needs to be unpacked and any challenges exposed.
ESMA is a technocratic agency and its powers are delegated, but the third
country regime is currently of acutely high political salience: ESMA may ac-
cordingly be exposed to legitimacy risks,6 even allowing for the well-charted
fuzziness of the border between political (prohibited) and technocratic (dele-
gated) agency action.7 More generally, given the burgeoning evidence that
ESMA has become a highly dynamic, purposeful, and entrepreneurial techno-
cratic actor since its 2011 establishment,8 its approach to the third country re-
gime is something of a bellwether for ESMA’s future evolution more generally,
and for any related effectiveness or legitimacy strains.
This discussion therefore seeks to contribute to the literature on the EU’s third
country regime at a distinct political and technocratic inflection point by iden-
tifying emerging trends and their implications. It reflects on the recent legisla-
tive reforms and their political/institutional context; and it considers the impli-
4 IOSCO, Market Fragmentation and Cross-border Regulation, 2019.
5 For a pre-Brexit discussion see Lucia Quaglia, “The Politics of ‘Third Country Equiva-
lence’ in Post-Crisis Financial Services Regulation in The European Union”, Western
European Politics 38 (2015), 167 and Andreas Dür, “Fortress Europe or Open Door
Europe? The External Impact of the EU’s Single Market in Financial Services”, Journal
of European Public Policy 18 (2011), 619.
6 On the political importance of market access decisions see Eric Helleiner/Stefano Pa-
gliari, “The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Post-Crisis Research
Agenda”, International Organization 65 (2011), 169.
7 For two classic accounts see Mark Thatcher/Alec Stone Sweet, “Theory and Practice of
Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions”,Western European Politics 25 (2002), 1 and
Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe, 1996.
8 For analysis see:NiamhMoloney, The Age of ESMA –Governing EU Financial Markets,
2018. Elements of section two of this discussion are drawn from chapter six.
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cations of ESMA’s strengthening technocratic powers in an area that is likely to
become increasingly politically-contested.
Section Two outlines the main features of the EU’s third country regime for
capital markets and of ESMA’s technocratic role. Section Three considers the
Brexit-era legislative reform process, its context, and the implications. Section
Four offers a modest reform prescription. Section Five concludes.
2. The Third Country Regime: A Helicopter View
2.1 The Equivalence Regime
The EU, in common with all major financial markets internationally, controls
access by non-domestic/non-EU (third country) actors to its financial market.
Most usually, an EU-level access regime is not available, and third country
actors must instead engage bilaterally with individual Member States, being
accordingly ‘locked within’ such Member States’ markets and not benefiting
from single market access. There are, however, a number of single market ac-
cess regimes for discrete segments of the EU financial market. The rules which
govern such access by third country actors are scattered in legislative silos
across sectoral EU financial market legislation. Usually these access rules re-
quire some form of ‘equivalence’ determination by the Commission as to the
extent of the alignment between the EU’s and the third country’s rules and
supervisory arrangements.9 In addition, reciprocal obligations, third country
compliance with different supervisory and taxation cooperation requirements,
and, most recently, third country compliance with global anti-money launder-
ing and terrorism financing standards also apply. The equivalence determina-
tion, however, is at the core of the EU’s third country regime for financial ser-
vices and markets. Some 40 or so legislative provisions cover the different third
country arrangements for financial services/markets and over 280 equivalence
decisions have been taken in respect of more than 30 third countries.10
The required equivalence determination by the Commission is crucial to third
country access. In very broad terms, where a particular capital market segment
has an EU third country regime in place, and where the relevant third country
regulatory/supervisory regime is deemed by the Commission to be ‘equiva-
lent’ to the relevant sectoral EU regime (different legislative criteria for asses-
sing equivalence apply and the Commission’s decision is discretionary), a
9 For an institutional perspective see: European Parliament, Briefing, Third Country
Equivalence in EU Banking Legislation, 9th December 2016.
10 Commission, Equivalence in the area of Financial Services (COM(2019)349).
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third-country-regulated actor can access the EU capital market segment in
question on the basis of those third country rules.11 Registration/recognition
and/or supervisory coordination andmonitoring requirements may also apply.
The EU capital market access regime can thus be broadly characterised as a
‘deference’ model: once the threshold equivalence assessment is successful, the
EU does not usually require ‘on-shore’ (in the EU) supervision of relevant
third country actors or apply its rules directly.12
The EU’s third country regime for capital markets, reflecting the multiple and
shifting interests which have shaped it, is, as is well known, partial and silo-ed.
But at its core are the MiFID II/MiFIR, EMIR, and rating agency third coun-
try regimes. In all these cases, third country access to the EU depends on a
prior positive equivalence decision by the Commission; the determinants of
equivalence in each case are specified in the relevant legislation. Also in all these
cases, ESMA is engaged to greater or less extents.
Since January 2018, MiFID II/MiFIR13 permits the provision of third country
investment services to EU wholesale market participants, without a require-
ment for an EU presence and on a cross-border services basis, once a positive
Commission equivalence decision is in place. Third country access is also con-
tingent on the regulated actor being ‘registered’ with ESMA. ESMA registra-
tion requires that the Commission equivalence decision is in place; the firm is
authorised in its home jurisdiction and subject to effective supervision and en-
forcement there; and related supervisory coordination arrangements with the
third country supervisor have been established (MiFIR, Article 46). ESMA is
not empowered to supervise these registered third country firms, but it can
withdraw a registration decision.14 Third country access has yet to be granted
under MiFID II/MiFIR.
11 The EU’s third country rules also have a significant internal dimension, clear from
the enhanced capital requirements which apply to EU banks’ third country loan
assets that do not originate in an ‘equivalent’ third country, the rules which require that
certain share and derivative trades by EU counterparties are carried out on EU venues
or ‘equivalent’ third country venues, and the obligation that certain derivatives are
cleared on CCPs in the EU or in ‘equivalent’ third countries.
12 The deference model is not common internationally but has been associated in particular
with the short-lived embrace by theUS, immediately prior to the financial crisis, of a ‘sub-
stituted compliance’ access model for certain financial sectors and for qualifying jurisdic-
tions:Howell Jackson,“SubstitutedCompliance: theEmergentChallenges andEvolution
of aNewRegulatory Paradigm”, Journal of Financial Regulation 1 (2015), 169.
13 Directive 2014/65/EU [2014] OJ L173/349 and Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 [2014]
OJ L173/84.
14 The conditions governing ESMA’s withdrawal of registration (MiFIR, Art. 49) relate to
ESMA having ‘well-founded reasons based on documented evidence’ that the firm, in
relation to its EU activities, is acting in a manner clearly prejudicial to the interests of
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The EMIR regime15 contains several third-country-access-related provisions,
but at its core is the access regime for third country central clearing counter-
parties (CCPs). ESMA may ‘recognise’ a third country CCP, which can then
provide services in the EU, when a series of conditions are met (EMIR, Arti-
cle 25(2)). Central to the ESMA recognition regime is the adoption of a prior
positive equivalence decision by the Commission. The CCP in question must
also be authorised in the relevant third country and, in ESMA’s judgment, be
subject to effective supervision and enforcement, ensuring full compliance
with the third country’s prudential requirements. Appropriate co-operation
arrangements must also have been established between ESMA and the relevant
third country supervisor. As under MiFIR, ESMA is not empowered to super-
vise ‘recognised’ CCPs but engages in ongoing review and monitoring of the
recognition conditions. ESMA has, however, recently claimed a form of super-
visory oversight in that in practice it monitors third country CCPs for stability
and other risks they may pose to the EU financial market, in accordance with
its general ESMA Regulation mandate to support financial stability.16 ESMA
recognised a first group of 11 CCPs in 2016 (following the related Commis-
sion equivalence decisions) and has continued to recognise CCPs as subse-
quent Commission equivalence decisions are made.17
A similar regime applies to third country trade repositories under EMIR. A
trade repository established in a third country may provide services and activ-
ities to entities established in the EU only after it has been ‘recognised’ by
ESMA (EMIR, Article 77(1)). ESMA recognition is conditional on the trade
repository submitting to ESMA all the necessary information, including at least
investors or the orderly functioning of markets, or that the firm has seriously infringed
provisions applicable to it in the third country and based on which the equivalence de-
cision was made.
15 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 [2012] OJ 201/1.
16 ESMA, ESMA’s Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies, Trade Repositories and Moni-
toring of Third Country Central Counterparties. 2016 Annual Report and 2017 Work
Programme, 2017, pp. 60–65.
17 ESMA has recognised ten additional third country CCPs and continues to assess appli-
cations: ESMA, ESMA’s Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies, Trade Repositories and
Monitoring of Third Country Central Counterparties. 2018 Annual Report and 2019
Work Programme, 2019, pp. 58–59. ESMA also prepared temporary recognition deci-
sions for three UK CCPs as a mitigant against a no-deal Brexit, following the Commis-
sion’s adoption of a related exceptional and temporary equivalence measure (noted be-
low). Following the October 2019 agreement between the UK and the EU on a
Withdrawal Agreement, and the expected (at the time of writing) withdrawal of the UK
from the EU on 31 January 2020, this immediate risk has been removed, although con-
cerns remain as to the potential for a December 2020 ‘cliff edge’ if the UK and EU fail to
agree a trade deal.
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the information necessary to verify that the trade repository is authorised and
subject to effective supervision in a third country which has been recognised by
the Commission as being equivalent in accordance with EMIR, and appropri-
ate co-operation arrangements being in place (Articles 77(2) and 75(3)). As yet,
no third country trade repository has applied for ESMA recognition.
ESMA is also pivotal to the two-pronged third country regime which applies
under EU rating agency legislation (the Consolidated Credit Rating Agency
Regulation (CCRAR)18). First, under the legislation’s ‘endorsement regime’,
where a third country rating agency forms part of a group which includes an
EU rating agency, its ratings can be used for regulatory purposes in the EU
where the rating is ‘endorsed’ by the EU rating agency (CCRAR, Article 4).
A series of conditions which are policed by ESMA (and which include an
equivalence-like ‘as stringent as the CCRAR’ assessment by ESMA of the re-
levant third country rules) apply to the endorsement process. These conditions
in effect allow ESMA to supervise the third country rating agency by super-
vising how the ‘endorsing EU rating agency’ complies with its endorsement
obligations.19 Second, under the CCRAR ‘equivalence/certification regime’, a
third country rating agency which is not associated with an EU rating agency
may issue ratings which can be used for regulatory purpose in the EU, but the
rating agency must be ‘certified’ by ESMA (CCRAR, Article 5). For such cer-
tification, the third country rating agency must be authorised or registered and
subject to supervision in the third country; the Commissionmust have adopted
a positive equivalence decision relating to the legal and supervisory framework
of the third country; and co-operation arrangements between ESMA and the
third country authority must be in place (Article 5(1)). A certified rating
agency is supervised by ESMA to ensure it complies with the conditions of its
certification. While a number of third country rating agencies have been en-
dorsed, only four third country rating agencies have been certified.20
A host of other sectoral capital market legislative measures conain different
types of third country/equivalence arrangements. For example, the 2017 Pro-
spectus Regulation permits the use of third country prospectuses to meet EU
disclosure requirement once an equivalence assessment is passed and supervi-
18 The EU’s rating agency regime is split across four legislative measures. References here
relate to the Commission’s informal consolidation of the texts in the Consolidated Cred-
it Rating Agency Regulation (CCRAR) (ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/1060/
2015-06-21).
19 ESMA has emphasised its supervisory and enforcement jurisdiction over ‘endorsing’
EU rating agencies: ESMA, Final Report. Technical Advice on CRA Regulatory
Equivalence – CRA 3 Update, 2017, pp. 7–8.
20 The current list is available via https://www.esma.europa.eu/supervision/credit-rating-
agencies/risk.
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sory cooperation arrangements are in place;21 the 2016 Benchmark Regulation
contains an equivalence/access regime for third country benchmark adminis-
trators which is based on recognition by national competent authorities
(NCAs) but which also requires ESMA to enter into cooperation arrange-
ments (under the 2019 ESA Regulation reforms, however, ESMA will be re-
sponsible for recognising such administrators from 2022);22 and the 2014 Cen-
tral Securities Depositaries Regulation deploys an ESMA ‘recognition’ me-
chanism for third country depositaries which requires a Commission
equivalence decision.23
2.2 The Institutional Setting, Technocracy and ESMA
In practice, the Commission controls these different third country regimes,
once they are adopted by the co-legislators, in that it adopts the administrative
equivalence decisions which open (or close) third country access.24 In its Feb-
ruary 2017 Report on Equivalence25 the Commission asserted its institutional
pre-eminence, highlighting that a Commission equivalence decision is unilat-
eral and discretionary and can be changed or withdrawn as necessary ‘at any
moment.’26 It is also clear that, while the Commission usually calls on ESMA’s
technical expertise when making equivalence decisions, in areas of acute poli-
tical salience the Commission retains the equivalence process inhouse. For ex-
ample, it managed the highly sensitive and market-critical 2017 US equiva-
lence determination relating to the MiFIR ‘derivatives trading obligation’
(which requires that certain classes of derivative be traded on an EU trading
venue or on a trading venue operating in an equivalent regulatory regime).
The Commission’s finding that certain trading venues supervised by the US
Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) did meet the equiva-
lence criteria followed negotiations with the CFTC and the adoption by the
Commission and the CFTC of a ‘general approach’ to govern the application
of the respective EU and US derivatives trading obligations to EU and US
21 Regulation (EU) No 2017/1129 [2017] OJ L168/12, Arts. 29–30.
22 Regulation (EU) No 2016/1011 [2016] OJ L171/1, Arts. 30–33.
23 Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 [2014] OJ L257/1, Art. 25.
24 The Commission is typically conferred with the power to initiate the equivalence pro-
cess and to adopt an equivalence decision. Commission decision-making on equivalence
(decisions take the form of Implementing Acts) is overseen by a comitology committee
which includes Member State representatives, but it is procedurally difficult to over-ride
the Commission.
25 Commission, EU Equivalence Decisions in Financial Services Policy: An Assessment
(SWD(2017)102).
26 European Parliament, (fn. 9).
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trading venues.27 ESMAwas not directly involved in this process, although it
had earlier acknowledged market concern as to the potential disruption that
failure to adopt an equivalence decision could wreak.28
Nonetheless, it is clear that since its 2011 establishment ESMA has emerged as
pivotal player in the equivalence process. ESMA is charged under its founding
Regulation with assisting the Commission on equivalence decisions29 and in
practice is almost always called on by the Commission for technical advice. In
relation to the rating agency certification process, for example, the Commis-
sion’s initial related equivalence decisions were closely based on ESMA’s earlier
technical assessments.30 The Commission’s first set of EMIR CCP equivalence
decisions also broadly reflected ESMA’s overall approach, albeit that ESMA’s
advice was potentially politically sensitive in that in several cases it made a
finding of conditional equivalence, advising the Commission that it could con-
sider the relevant regime to be equivalent where CCPs ensured their internal
rules and procedures reflected certain EMIR provisions. The Commission
broadly followed ESMA’s approach, although it did not specify in its equiva-
lence decisions the specific adjustments that ESMA recommended be made by
CCPs, save as regards US CCPs;31 the US CCP negotiations were also con-
ducted at a higher political level than those relating to other jurisdictions.32
More recently, the extent of ESMA’s influence on the equivalence process is
clear from its 2017 advice to the Commission that certain jurisdictions were no
longer equivalent as regards rating agency regulation;33 the Commission has
since rescinded several of its CCRAR equivalence decisions, as noted below. It
is also becoming clear that the equivalence process affords ESMA significant
opportunities to strengthen its credibility and so its ability to exert influence
on the regime, given the technical competence, astute international financial
diplomacy, and deft institutional politicking which these assessments require.34
Similarly, the requirement for third countries to enter into cooperation agree-
ments, usually a precondition of equivalence decisions, has given ESMA a
platform from which it can build relationships internationally and also deepen
27 Commission Implementing Decision 2017/2238 [2017] OJ L320/11.
28 ESMA, Final Report –Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on the Trading Obligation
for Derivatives under MiFIR (2017).
29 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 [2010] OJ L331/84), Art. 33.
30 ESMA/2012/259 and ESMA/2013/262.
31 Commission Implementing Decision 2016/377 [2016] OJ L70/32.
32 The CCP equivalence discussions with the US were difficult and required high level
EU/US political engagement: House of Lords, EU Committee, 9th Report of Session
2016-2017, Brexit: Financial services (2016), para. 49.
33 ESMA CRA 3 Update 2017 (fn. 19).
34 ESMA’s technical advice on the equivalence of the Australian CCP regime, e.g., involved
close engagement with the relevant Australian regulators (ESMA/2013/BS/1159).
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its intelligence on international financial governance, either by supporting
NCAs in adopting such agreements, or by adopting such agreements indepen-
dently.35
The extent of ESMA’s related gatekeeper role is also becoming clear. Thus far,
gatekeeper functions have been conferred on ESMA only in relation to the
‘registration’ of firms under MiFIR (on which there is as yet no evidence); the
‘certification’ of rating agencies under the rating agency regime; and the ‘recog-
nition’ of third country CCPs and trade repositories under EMIR. Of these
three, there is most experience with CCP recognition. The initial 2016-2017
experience with ESMA’s recognition of 11 CCPs certainly evidences an emer-
ging ESMA determination to maximise its ability to exercise some form of
oversight over third country CCPs, despite the limitations of the recognition
process which does not at present grant ESMA direct supervisory powers.36
Under EMIR, ESMA is required to monitor ongoing compliance by recog-
nised third country CCPs with their recognition conditions, including any re-
lated conditions on the underlying equivalence finding,37 but it is not empow-
ered to supervise them directly. Nonetheless, from the outset ESMA claimed a
financial stability mandate to monitor CCPs’ recognition conditions against
the potential risks which third country CCPs posed to the EU market; and it
has also developed bespoke data collection channels and risk indicators for
monitoring potential risks to the EU market.38 Further, in the wake of the
Brexit decision, ESMA used its third country CCP experience to call for more
extensive powers over third country CCPs and other third country actors39 –
to some effect, given the EMIR 2.2 reforms to the CCP regime subsequently
adopted in 2019, noted below.
35 ESMA’s first set of CCP recognition decisions was accompanied by ESMA’s conclusion
of 11 Memoranda of Understanding with 15 different CCP supervisors: ESMA, Annual
Report on 2016, 2017, p. 61.
36 ESMA must recognise a third country CCP where it meets the four EMIR recognition
conditions (a Commission equivalence decision is in place; the CCP is authorised and
subject to effective third country supervision and enforcement; ESMA/third country
supervisor cooperation arrangements are in place; and EMIR’s requirements on compli-
ance with anti-money-laundering and anti-terrorism financing standards are met), none
of which require that the risk the CCP potentially poses to EU financial stability is
assessed.
37 The Commission’s US equivalence decision, e.g., requires that ESMA monitor US
CCPs to ensure their internal systems support their compliance with identified EU
rules: ESMA, Annual Report on 2016, 2017, p. 61.
38 ESMA, Annual Report on 2016, 2017, pp. 61–62.
39 E.g. ESMA, Response to the Public Consultation on the Operations of the European
Supervisory Authorities, 2017, p. 3.
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2.3 Effectiveness and Legitimacy as the Third Country Regime Comes
under Pressure
The Commission regards the third country/equivalence regime as an EU-or-
iented process, primarily designed to safeguard the EU’s financial stability and
only secondarily concernedwithmarket access. It also asserts, however, that the
process is outcomes-based, concerned with results, and governed by propor-
tionality and the need to achieve risk-based outcomes.40 Despite this broadly
accommodating external stance, the challenges raised by the third country/
equivalence regime have been extensively discussed since 2016when it came un-
der renewed scrutiny in the wake of the Brexit decision and the related reconsi-
deration of CMU and the EU’s position in the global capital market.
Multiple effectiveness challenges have been identified. These range from the
silo-ed and partial nature of the regime which does not cover the full range of
capital market activity; its procedural complexity; the slow pace of the equiva-
lence process; the risks of the equivalence process becoming overly prescrip-
tive;41 the contingent nature of the Commission equivalence decision (which,
as the Commission has repeatedly underlined, is unilateral and discretionary);
the open-textured nature of the criteria that apply to equivalence; the risk of
market disruption on a refusal or withdrawal of equivalence; and, more funda-
mentally, the risks the regime poses to the EU’s competitiveness if access is
deterred.42 The challenges also include those related to the adequacy of legiti-
mation and which flow from, for example, the opacity of the equivalence pro-
cess; its limited justiciability;43 and the extent of the Commission’s control over
what can be decisions of very high political salience to the EU. The specific
challenges which will be faced by the UK as a major third country capital mar-
ket have also been exhaustively examined.44
Less attention has been given to ESMA’s increasing technocratic influence over
the third country regime and to any related effectiveness and legitimacy risks.
There is little evidence yet on how ESMA deploys its limited gatekeeping
powers under the third country regime. The emerging evidence on CCP re-
cognition certainly augurs well, suggesting an ESMA concern to ensure finan-
cial stability risks are monitored and managed. There is significantly more evi-
dence on ESMA’s role in the equivalence process. Here, the extent of ESMA’s
40 Commission Equivalence Report 2017 (fn. 25).
41 In support of a flexible, outcomes-based approach to equivalence see Jackson (fn. 12).
42 For a specific example of stakeholder concern see, in the EMIR context, Commission,
Impact Assessment for the 2017 EMIR Proposal (SWD(2017)246), p. 36.
43 SeeHowell (fn. 3).
44 For an industry perspective see International Regulatory Strategy Group, The EU’s
Third Country Regime and Alternatives to Passporting (2017).
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influence – even allowing for the Commission’s pre-eminence – places it close
to politically sensitive market access determinations and so requires a focus on
its effectiveness and legitimacy as a technocratic actor.
ESMA’s effectiveness in this area can be related to its ability to provide the
Commission with expertly-informed, practical assessments, which avoid pre-
scription but are responsive to the different features of markets and financial
governance internationally, and which rigorously deploy the conditions which
the legislative process has applied to EU capital market access. In some re-
spects, a timorous and accommodating approach to equivalence assessments
might have been expected as ESMA, as a relatively new agency internationally,
has strong incentives to build effective relationships with regulators interna-
tionally and not to antagonise major global market operators; in other respects,
the political sensitivity of the equivalence process and the Commission’s pre-
eminence might have led ESMA to adopt a rigid, box-ticking approach. The
evidence suggests, however, that ESMA has embraced its equivalence advice
mandates with some confidence, generally deploying a technically expert, flex-
ible and responsive, but also forensic, approach, which has provided the Com-
mission with a secure evidence base on which to make equivalence decisions.
The first major test of ESMA’s approach to equivalence came with the rating
agency regime. Here ESMA adopted a pragmatic ‘objective-based approach’
under which the capabilities of the jurisdiction in question to meet the objec-
tives of the EU’s rating agency regime would be assessed from a holistic per-
spective.45 ESMA’s assessment of the equivalence of the US regime, for exam-
ple, found that the few remaining uncertainties as regards equivalence were not
capable of materially detracting from a positive equivalence finding; that
ESMA had gained comfort from its discussions with the US regulator (the
SEC); that the application in practice by firms of the US requirements would
lead to equivalence; and that the equivalence review involved an assessment of
the combined effect of the requirements reviewed and not only individual pro-
visions. Similarly, while ESMA’s ‘second generation’ 2017 equivalence advice
on the rating agency regime was forensic and assertive (finding four of the nine
jurisdictions reviewed were no longer equivalent), its approach overall was
holistic and pragmatic. ESMA found, for example, that certain jurisdictions’
regimes were equivalent to the EU rating agency regime even though these
third country rules did not directly map on to the regime – the overall outcome
achieved was sufficiently similar.46 The other major body of evidence concerns
45 ESMA, Technical Advice on CRA Regulatory Equivalence – US, Canada and Australia
(2012).
46 ESMA found e.g. that while the new EU rules on cross-ownership levels between rating
agencies were not mapped in the US regime, the applicable US conflict of interest rules
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ESMA’s assessments of third country CCP regimes’ equivalence. Here, in a
politically complex context,47 ESMA pursued a technically detailed but out-
comes-based and pragmatic approach. From ESMA’s initial Autumn 2013 ser-
ies of equivalence assessments, the Australian CCP regime assessment48 is in-
dicative, being objectives-based; designed to assess, from a holistic perspective,
the capability of the third country regime to meet the objectives of EMIR; and
evidence-based, including on evidence derived from liaison with the relevant
Australian authorities. ESMA also highlighted over this process its concern to
consider the consequences for the EU regime were a regime to be found not to
be equivalent and CCP access disrupted. ESMA further adopted a deft ap-
proach to navigating the international political sensitivities, deploying, as
noted above, a ‘conditional equivalence’model for those jurisdictions (the ma-
jority) for which it found that, while there were material divergences between
the EU and the third country regimes, equivalence could be achieved by the
CCP in question taking internal remedial action: ESMA Chair Maijoor high-
lighted that ESMA was concerned to avoid a ‘zero sum’ approach to equiva-
lence.49 Similarly, while ESMAwas ultimately side-lined during the subsequent
difficult EU/US negotiations on CCP equivalence, it was concerned to sup-
port a pragmatic solution and, following the final EU/US agreement, under-
lined that it “would do everything in its power” to shorten its review period
for US CCP recognition in light of the time pressure which the lengthy equiva-
lence negotiations had created.50
ESMA has also sought to mitigate the market uncertainties that equivalence
decisions, or the absence thereof, can generate, including through its soft
supervisory convergence tools. It has used its MiFID II/MiFIR Q&A, for ex-
ample, to explain how the share trading obligation (which requires that certain
shares must be traded on identified classes of trading venue in the EU or on
equivalent third country trading venues) applies in relation to third country
venues.51 Overall, the evidence suggests that ESMA has been technically as-
sured, outcomes-focused and pragmatic, but also forensic in assessing equiva-
lence regimes and not afraid to find jurisdictions not equivalent. There are per-
achieved the same investor protection outcomes sought by the EU: ESMA CRA3 Up-
date 2017 (fn. 19), pp. 79–87.
47 See Peter Knaack, “Innovation and Deadlock in Global Financial Governance: transat-
lantic coordination failure in OTC derivatives regulation”, Review of International Po-
litical Economy 22 (2015), 1217.
48 ESMA/2013/1159.
49 Steven Maijoor, Speech on “International co-ordination of the regulation and supervi-
sion of OTC derivatives markets”, 17th October 2013.
50 ESMA, ESMA Resumes US CCP Recognition Process Following EU-US Agreement,
10th February 2016.
51 ESMA, Press Release, 13th November 2017.
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sistent and well-charted difficulties with the equivalence regime, but these tend
to be associated with the Commission and not with ESMA.
ESMA’s burgeoning influence, as an agency exercising delegated powers in an
area of significant (and increasing) political sensitivity, raises nonetheless the
prospect of legitimation risks, although there are mitigants. ESMA’s supervi-
sory/recognition/registration gatekeeping powers are limited, conferred in leg-
islative measures, and subject to extensive proceduralisation in the relevant
legislation52 as well as to the constraints imposed by the EU Treaties, most
notably the Meroni principle.53 And as regards the equivalence process, the
Commission remains the decision-maker and ESMA is formally an adviser
only. Although the Commission usually follows ESMA’s advice, it does not
always and where equivalence becomes politically contested the Commission
typically becomes the main EU actor, as has been the case with different EU/
US negotiations. Legitimation concerns are not, however, absent and look set
to increase given the recent adoption of a series of reforms strengthening
ESMA’s powers in 2019.
As the Brexit-era began to unfold from mid-2016 the challenges posed by the
third country regimewere, therefore, already clear. Andwhile ESMAwas emer-
ging as an effective technocratic actor, nascent legitimacy strains could be identi-
fied. After the post-2016 outbreak of legislative reform – primarily associated
with the CMU agenda and the 2017 European Supervisory Authority reform
process, although very hard to disentangle from Brexit – all the current indica-
tions suggest there is political and institutional appetite for some reform, but for
reform that retrenches the regime in an austere, stability-oriented, inward-fa-
cing, and increasingly centralisedmanner.At the same time, there is considerable
appetite for empowering ESMA in this area. Whether or not the reforms will
equip the EU optimally to navigate the post-Brexit environment is not clear.
3. The Current Direction of Travel: An Austere Approach
3.1 Brexit as a Crucible for Change
EU capital market regulation develops in fits and starts. While its evolution is
typically incremental, shocks and crises reshuffle political and institutional in-
terests, re-set priorities, and generate ingenious legal and political solutions to
problems previously thought intractable or trivial. As has been exhaustively
52 MiFIR and EMIR set out in detail the scope and operation of ESMA’s registration and
recognition powers.
53 ECJ, 13th June 1958,Meroni v High Authority, Case 9-56, ECLI:EU:C:1958:7.
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considered, the financial crisis provided the crucible within which the Eur-
opean System of Financial Supervision was forged, as well as Banking Union
and the regulatory leviathan that is the single rulebook. Brexit might, accord-
ingly, have been expected to shunt the third country regime at least a little from
its current trajectory as interests and preferences were reset. That indeed seems
to have happened, but not in a more liberal direction. While there are signs of
the regime evolving, all the indications are of an increasingly austere approach.
The changes are not, however, radical: the deference principle remains the basis
of the third country regime.54 Nonetheless, the evidence is pointing towards a
more prescriptive, institutionalised, and ‘on-shore’ regime.
Prior to the Brexit decision and the emergence of the UK as a future off-shore,
third country financial centre of systemic importance to the EU, the EU’s third
country regime for capital market access was a natural target for reform or at
least for reconsideration. The EU capital market was recovering from the fi-
nancial-crisis-era market and regulatory convulsions, and political and institu-
tional space was opening up for reform. The CMU agenda, for example,
launched in 2015, was bringing a sharper focus to bear on the third country
regime and whether it supported the EU sufficiently in the global capital mar-
ket.55 Further, the EU was gaining experience with, and confidence in, ESMA
as a technocratic vehicle for international financial regulatory policy; any re-
form of ESMA (finally launched in 201756) might accordingly have been ex-
pected to engage with the third country regime.
Post-2016, Brexit might have been expected to generate additional reform im-
pulses. On its withdrawal from the EU and after the transition period (expected
to close at the end of December 2020), the UK will become a third country on
which, at least based on current conditions, the EU will have a systemic depen-
dence. Some 35% of the EU’s capital market activity, and in particular much of
its risk management capacity, is based in the UK. Early indications suggested
that the UK was seeking a bespoke access arrangement for capital market ser-
vices, based on the UK and EU recognising their respective regimes and on al-
lowing regulatory divergence as long as high-level outcomes converged.57 The
54 ESMA Chair Maijoor recently noted that “the underlying objective of an extensive use
of deference by the EU has not a changed”: Speech on “Building the EU Capital Mar-
kets Union while fostering Global Financial Markets”, 10th October 2019.
55 e.g. ECOFIN Council Conclusions on the Commission Action Plan on Building a Ca-
pital Markets Union, 10thNovember 2015 (Council Document 13922/15), calling on the
Commission to assess the impact of the different third-country regimes on European
capital markets and on financial sector competitiveness.
56 COM(2017)536.
57 Prime Minister May’s important Mansion House Speech (March 2018) called for an ac-
cess arrangement based on a “collaborative, objective framework that is reciprocal, mu-
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EUmight similarly given theCMUagenda and the current identity between the
EU and UK rulebooks, have been expected to consider some finessing of the
third country/equivalence regime or some form of bespoke arrangement.58
All the current indications suggest, however, that neither the CMU agenda nor
Brexit have driven a more liberal EU approach. The stability of the EU capital
market, the autonomy of the single rulebook, and the enhancement of the EU’s
capacity to monitor third country actors, through ESMA, appear to be the
driving concerns.
3.2 The Emerging Mosaic
With respect to UK market access specifically, all the indications are that the
EU is unlikely to concede bespoke access arrangements. The March 2018 Eur-
opean Council Brexit negotiating guidelines do not expressly reference finan-
cial services/markets. They underline, however, that any future trade agree-
ment in services must be consistent with the UK being a third country and
operate on the basis of host state (EU) rules, and that any future framework
must safeguard financial stability in the EU and respect its regulatory and
supervisory arrangements.59 The 2014-2019 European Parliament had ex-
pressly referenced the EU/UK financial services/markets relationship, but de-
clared that the EU’s third country regime must govern any UK access.60 The
October 2019 Revised Political Declaration on the framework for the future
EU/UK relationship is similar in tone. It notes that the parties are committed
to preserving financial stability, market integrity, and consumer/investor pro-
tection and fair competition, while respecting both parties’ regulatory and de-
cision-making autonomy and their ability to take equivalence decisions; it also
tually agreed, and permanent and therefore reliable for business”; and on the EU and
UK maintaining the same “regulatory outcomes” over time: Speech on “Our future
economic partnership with the European Union”, 2nd March 2018. The UK industry
had earlier pressed for such an approach (e.g. UK Finance, Supporting Europe’s Econo-
mies and Citizens: A modern approach to financial services in an EU-UK Trade Agree-
ment (2017)). A leading parliamentary report also called on the UK government to
either secure substantial changes to the third country/equivalence regime or (the pre-
ferred option) ensure access through a bespoke free trade agreement incorporating mu-
tual recognition mechanisms (House of Lords, EU Committee, 11th Report of Session
2017-2019, Brexit: the Future of Financial Regulation and Supervision (2018)).
58 As argued recently in: Jonathan Faull/Simon Gleeson, The Capital Markets Union:
Should the EU shut out the City of London, Centre for European Reform, 2019.
59 European Council (Art. 50) Guidelines of 23th March 2018.
60 European Parliament, Resolution of 14th March 2018 on the Framework of the future
EU-UK Relationship (P8_TA-PROV(2018)0069).
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urges both Parties to start assessing equivalence under their respective frame-
works as soon as possible.61 There are no serious indicators, among the re-
spectful aspirational statements in the Revised Declaration as to the importance
of close regulatory and supervisory cooperation, of any EU appetite for a be-
spoke financial services/capital market access arrangement.62Most recently, the
Commission’s presentation to the Council on 10 January 2020 concerning the
future relationship and cooperation and equivalence in financial services (avail-
able on the Commission’s UKTF website) does not suggest any liberalisation
of the EU's position, stresses that equivalence decisions are unilateral and dis-
cretionary, notes that the future relationship will not be “business as usual”,
and underlines that the EU will be led by its interests. Some indications of
compromise could earlier be identified in the exceptional equivalence decisions
taken by the Commission in April 2019 as regards the temporary equivalence/
ESMA-recognised status of three UK CCPs (and one UK CSD).63 This was to
ensure that, given the EMIR requirement that certain derivatives must be
cleared on an EU CCP or equivalent third country CCP, the clearing of EU
derivatives transactions could continue to take place in the UK (the major cen-
tre for the clearing of certain EU derivatives) on a ‘no deal’ exit; the financial
stability risks to the EU if access to UK clearing services was abruptly ruptured
drove this action. New Commission Vice-President Dombrovskis has also in-
dicated that these decisions could be extended beyond their original March
2020 expiry date if it proves necessary in the future.64 A different picture, how-
ever, emerges from the parallel MiFIR-related share trading obligation fracas.
A no-deal UK withdrawal would also, given the scope of the MiFIR share
trading obligation, have meant that certain EU shares could no longer be
traded on leading London trading venues, in the absence of an exceptional
equivalence decision by the Commission. Notwithstanding the significant li-
quidity and market disruption risks given the scale of EU share trading in Lon-
don, the Commission did not take formal action, although ESMA sought to
clarify the position to the extent it could within its mandate.65 The market dis-
ruption risk was identified as significant, for the EU as well as the UK, and
61 Revised Text of the Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future rela-
tionship between the EU and the UK (TF50(2019) 65), 17th October 2019, para. 35.
62 The financial services section (paras. 35–37) is brief, short in detail, and long in worthy
statements as to the need for cooperation.
63 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/544 [2019] OJ L95/9 and Commission
Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/545 [2019] OJ L95/11.
64 Commission Vice President Dombrovskis, Speech on “Priorities of the new European
Commission for Sustainability and Green Finance”, 15 November 2019.
65 ESMA, Public Statement. Impact of Brexit on the Trading Obligation for Shares.
29 May 2019 (ESMA70-154-1204).
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may arise again if the UK fails to agree an appropriate trade deal by the end of
2020.66
More generally, there are few signs that the emergence of the UK as a systemi-
cally-significant third country with an offshore capital market of acute impor-
tance to the EU is proving conducive to a rethinking of the third country
regime’s design. Early indications came in December 2017, when the Commis-
sion adopted a highly contested, restrictive, and time-limited (one-year) deci-
sion on the equivalence of Swiss trading venues for the purposes of the MiFIR
share trading obligation. The positive equivalence decision, valid for one year
only, made any further positive equivalence finding by the Commission con-
tingent on resolution of amatter distinct from the EU capital market rulebook –
the establishment of a new EU/Switzerland institutional framework for exist-
ing and future agreements relating to Switzerland’s single market relation-
ships.67 Notwithstanding severe criticism from Switzerland and concern from
the European Parliament,68 the Swiss trading venue equivalence decision duly
lapsed in summer 2019, with some initial disruption to market liquidity as trad-
ing migrated to alternative trading venues.69 While specific to EU/Switzerland
relations, it is not unreasonable to draw a lesson from the imbroglio as to the
Commission’s intention to signal its control over the equivalence process, and
as to the unilateral and contingent nature of equivalence decisions.70
In a less febrile context, the Commission also recently carried out in its first-
ever mass withdrawal of equivalence decisions. In summer 2019, a series of
third countries lost their equivalence status as regards rating agency regulation
following their failure to update their regimes in light of subsequent reforms to
66 The potential for market disruption from the related fragmentation of liquidity was
raised by the Bank of England and the UK Financial Conduct Authority: Bank of Eng-
land, Financial Stability Report (2019), p. 6 and FCA Chief Executive Bailey, Speech on
“Preparing for Brexit in financial services: The state of play”, 16 September 2019. The
London Stock Exchange similarly warned of “many unintended consequences for the
ability of market participants, in particular EU27 firms and their clients, to manage their
portfolios and risk positions, and to achieve best execution”: London Stock Exchange,
Hard Brexit Impact Assessment, 5 September 2019, p. 3.
67 Commission Implementing Decision 2017/2441 [2017] OJ L344/52.
68 European Parliament, Resolution of 11 September 2019 on Relationships between the
EU and Third Countries concerning Financial Services Regulation and Supervision
(P8_TA(2018)0326), noting the “clear political dimension” of the Commission decision
and calling for closer scrutiny by the Parliament.
69 ESMA reported in Autumn 2019 on the migration of trading from the EU back to Swiss
trading venues: ESMA, Report on Trends, Risks and Vulnerabilities, No. 2 (2019),
pp. 14–15.
70 See, e.g., Dentons, Stuck in Neutral: Switzerland’s lost equivalence status, 7 August
2019.
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the EU rating agency regime.71 The context here is much less sensitive. There
had been extensive discussions between the Commission and the relevant jur-
isdictions over time; ESMA had previously identified the difficulties; the states
in question decided not to make the relevant reforms given the limited scale of
the rating activity engaged; the Commission waited for six years before with-
drawing equivalence; and the ‘endorsement’ regime, which runs alongside the
rating agency equivalence/certification regime, provides a further access
route.72 Nonetheless, that the Commission is intent on a muscular, unilateral
approach to equivalence, and on actively monitoring compliance with equiva-
lence decisions, is clear. These withdrawals have also been interpreted as heigh-
tening UK fears regarding future market access.73
A similar signal was sent by the Commission in its July 2019 report on equiva-
lence, the timing of which is unlikely to have been accidental.74 As it did in its
similarly-toned 2017 report,75 the Commission underlined that equivalence
was a tool for supporting financial stability and investor protection, as well as
for facilitating an open and globally integrated EU capital market: it was “a
flexible regulatory instrument capable of building bridges across jurisdictional
fault-lines.”76 It warned, however, that while equivalence can increase market
access opportunities, it was primarily a risk management tool. The tenor of the
report was to emphasise the unilateral and discretionary nature of the equiva-
lence tool, and that decisions can be suspended or withdrawn on the Commis-
sion’s discretion, albeit that the Commission underlined the risk-based and
proportionate nature of the assessment (although the Commission also empha-
sised that this meant that ‘high impact’ third countries could expect more strin-
gent requirements). The Commission interpreted the recent package of legisla-
tive reforms to the equivalence system (noted ahead) as ensuring the system
was more risk-based, better placed to take account of the impact of third coun-
try actors in the EUmarket, and had stronger capacity to monitor the status of
regulatory and supervisory developments in third countries found to be
equivalent. There is clearly little Commission appetite for any wholesale re-
form or liberalisation of equivalence (the Commission specifically rejected any
71 Five countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and Singapore) lost their equiva-
lence status. Four of these had earlier been identified by ESMA as no longer being
equivalent, while as regard the fifth (Canada), its status had been identified by ESMA as
being contingent on reforms (which did not follow).
72 See, e.g., Commission, Press Release on ‘Financial Services: Commission sets out its
equivalence policy with third countries’, 29 July 2019.
73 Jim Brunsden, “EU Decision on Equivalence set to Heighten UK post-Brexit fear”,
Financial Times, 28 July 2019.
74 2019 Equivalence Report (fn. 10).
75 2017 Equivalence Report (fn. 25).
76 2019 Equivalence Report (fn. 10), p. 12.
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move to a more standard, horizontal model) and much emphasis on better
monitoring of equivalence decisions, stronger on-shore (ESMA-based) super-
vision of third country actors, and enhanced review of ‘high impact’ sectors or
third countries.
The European Parliament has shown some interest in revising the equivalence
regime, but it has adopted a cautious approach. Its recent September 2019 Re-
solution on third countries and financial services77 did call for reforms, but
these were largely procedural and institutional in orientation, particularly as
regards the transparency of the regime, stronger European Supervisory
Authority (ESA) powers to monitor and review equivalence decisions, and en-
hanced Parliament oversight in light of the “clear political dimension” of
equivalence decisions (in a reference to the contested decision on Switzerland).
The Resolution did not call for major substantive change. It also underlined
that EU firms’ passporting rights were of a different order to equivalence-re-
lated access rights, that no EU trade agreement had ever incorporated cross-
border mutual access provisions on financial services, and emphasised the uni-
lateral and contingent nature of equivalence decisions. By contrast, the earlier
2018 ECONCommittee report on the Resolution was more ambitious, calling
for the EU to give close consideration to the equivalence regimes between the
EU and “high-impact third countries” in order to “develop stable and resilient
regulatory relationships with those countries which have close financial links
with the Union”.78
3.3 Legislative Reforms
The direction of travel as regards legislative reform, and so as regards theMem-
ber States’ preferences, is similar. The 2017 Securitisation Regulation, adopted
in the immediate aftermath of the Brexit decision, failed to include a third
country access regime, reflecting political tensions relating to the precedent it
could potentially have established for post-Brexit UK access.79 The 2017 Pro-
77 2019 European Parliament Third Countries and Financial Services Resolution (fn. 68).
78 ECON Committee, Draft Report on Relationships between the EU and Third Coun-
tries Concerning Financial Services Regulation and Supervision (2017/2253/NI), April
2018.
79 Regulation (EU) No 2017/2402 [2017] OJ L347/35. The new regime for ‘simple, trans-
parent, and standardised’ (STS) securitisations does not include third country arrange-
ments (although the Commission must by 2022 provide a report on whether to propose
a third country regime), an unusual omission that has been related to uncertainty as to
how to deal with the UK as a future major third country in this area (Jim Brunsden,
“Plans to Boost Securitisation Market Stalls over Brexit”, Financial Times, 6 February
2017).
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spectus Regulation, a less contested measure, tightens the pre-existing market
access system for prospectuses.80 The previous 2003 Prospectus Directive per-
mitted home supervisors (national competent authorities, NCAs) to approve a
third country prospectus as long as it was drawn up in accordance with inter-
national standards and the third country rules were equivalent to those of the
Directive: the regime was accordingly ‘on-shored’ in the EU in that third
country prospectuses could not avoid the NCA approval process. The 2017
Regulation has added additional conditions to this regime and is more pre-
scriptive as regards the home NCA approval.81 The third country disclosure
requirements must be equivalent to those of the Regulation; cooperation ar-
rangements must in place between the homeNCA and the relevant third coun-
try NCA, and these arrangements are subject to ESMA notification require-
ments andmust comply with new administrative rules governing the minimum
content of these arrangements (Article 30); and the now-standard require-
ments as regards the third country not being ‘blacklisted’ for its approach to
anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism apply (Article 29). The Com-
mission can establish general equivalence criteria in this area (but is not re-
quired to), and it may also adopt jurisdiction-level equivalence decisions,
although it has yet to do either. The Regulation also provides for third country
prospectuses to be drawn up in accordance with the Regulation and approved
by the relevant home NCA (Article 28). Subsequently, the 2017 ESA reform
package initially proposed that ESMA be conferred with approval and super-
visory powers over third country prospectuses, in a material centralisation of
the regime,82 but this reform did not survive the negotiation process given sig-
nificant Member State resistance. The most revealing evidence as to the direc-
tion of travel on third country access, however, comes from the package of
measures adopted in the dying days of the 2014-2019 Commission and Eur-
opean Parliament terms.
The March 2019 agreement by the European Parliament and Council on a new
Investment Firm Regulation, designed to enhance the prudential regulation of
investment firms, contains a significantly more prescriptive and intrusive mar-
ket access regime for third country investment firms than the current MiFIR
regime.83 The 2019 Regulation reforms the MiFIR regime by providing for
more intensive assessment prior to the adoption of any equivalence decision;
requiring enhanced assessment where third country firms have a systemic pre-
80 Regulation (EU) No 2017/1129 [2017] OJ L168/12.
81 The original Commission proposal was less restrictive.
82 COM(2017)536.
83 The proposals were reported as a significant toughening of the MiFIR equivalence re-
gime: Jim Brunsden, “Brussels Signals Tough Stance on UK Bank Bonuses after Brexit”,
Financial Times, 19 December 2017.
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sence in the EU; ‘on-shoring’ specific MiFID II/MiFIR requirements by mak-
ing them directly applicable; conferring ESMA with additional supervisory
powers; putting in place rigorous ex-post monitoring; and requiring enhanced
and regular reporting to the Council and Parliament.84 In particular, the
equivalence assessment has become materially more risk-based. Where the
scale and scope of the services provided by the relevant third country firm are
likely to be of systemic importance, equivalence may only be granted after a
“detailed and granular assessment” by the Commission of the prudential, or-
ganisational, and business conduct MiFID II/MiFIR rules that are subject to
the assessment; and, in a significant operational intensification of the equiva-
lence assessment, supervisory convergence between the EU and the third
country is also to be assessed.85 The Commission is further empowered to at-
tach “specific operational conditions” to equivalence decisions to ensure that
ESMA and NCAs have the necessary tools to prevent regulatory arbitrage and
to monitor firms’ activities in relation to equivalent third country rules relating
to, specifically, the MiFID II/MiFIR share and derivatives trading obligations,
post-trade transparency reporting, and transaction reporting. The threshold
requirements as regards supervisory cooperation arrangements with third
countries have also been enhanced. The requirement for information exchange
procedures has been strengthened by new obligations for onward-sharing ar-
rangements that allow ESMA to share third country information with NCAs,
and also by new requirements for procedures to be adopted governing specific
ESMA requests for information from third country firms. Further, the cur-
rently thin requirement for third countries to establish procedures for on-site
supervision of firms in the EU has become a much more intrusive requirement
for procedures governing coordination of investigations and on-site inspec-
tions by ESMA and NCAs. That the equivalence regime is contingent is made
incontrovertible by the new requirement for ESMA to monitor regulatory and
supervisory developments, enforcement practices, and relevant market devel-
opments in the third country in order to verify that the jurisdiction remains
equivalent; and to monitor the systemic footprint of ESMA-registered third
country firms. A related confidential report must be made to the Commission
annually.86 The signalling of intent is clear.
Once a third country investment firm is registered with ESMA, additional re-
porting requirements are imposed, many of which are directed to assessing the
EU footprint of firms. Annual reports must be provided to ESMA on the scale
and scope of firms’ EU activities; firms’monthly minimum, average, and max-
imum exposure to EU counterparties; the total value of financial instruments
84 Regulation (EU) No 2019/2033 [2019] OJ L314/1. Revised Arts. 46, 47, and 49
85 Revised Art. 47.
86 Revised Art. 47.
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(originating from EU counterparties) underwritten or placed in the previous
year; the turnover and aggregated value of assets relating to EU activities; and,
from a more regulatory perspective, investor protection, risk management and
governance arrangements and any other information deemed necessary to en-
able ESMA and NCAs to carry out their tasks.87 Firms must also retain at
ESMA’s disposal data relating to all orders and transactions in the EU for five
years. ESMA’s ongoing supervisory powers have also been enhanced, includ-
ing by a new power for ESMA to request from third country firms any further
information on their operations.88 ESMA’s disciplining powers have also been
strengthened. In particular, ESMA’s powers under MiFIR to withdraw a third
country firm’s registration have been strengthened by a new power to tem-
porarily prohibit or restrict a firm from providing services where it does not
comply with any exercise by ESMA or an NCA of MiFIR product interven-
tion powers, or with an ESMA information request, or does not cooperate
with an investigation or on-site inspection.89 Overall, there is a strongly opera-
tional hue to the new regime, both as regards the initial equivalence assessment
and in relation to ESMA’s subsequent supervisory relationship with the third
country firm. All in all, a materially more muscular and less deferential ap-
proach to third country access under MiFID II/MiFIR is signalled by the re-
forms.
The March 2019 agreement on reform of the ESAs similarly enhances the EU’s
monitoring powers over equivalence decisions.90 ESMA is empowered to
monitor developments in third countries found to be equivalent, particularly
as regards financial stability, market integrity, investor protection, and single
market functioning. It is also to verify ongoing compliance by third countries
with equivalence decisions and to report confidentially to the Commission,
Parliament, Council, and the other ESAs on its findings. If at any time ESMA
identifies relevant developments that may impact on financial stability, market
integrity, investor protection and single market functioning, it is to inform the
institutions without delay. The procedural arrangements governing equiva-
lence decisions are also strengthened in that any cooperation arrangements en-
tered into with third country authorities are to allow information to be ob-
tained by ESMA and to permit ESMA to follow up on equivalence decisions,
including in relation to the operation of on-site inspections.91 ESMA also ac-
quires operational powers over third country benchmark administrators under
these reforms, taking over the recognition process from NCAs in 2022.
87 Revised Art. 46.
88 Revised Art. 46.
89 Revised Art. 49.
90 Regulation (EU) No 2019/2175 [2019] OJ L334/1.
91 2019 ESA Reform Regulation, revised ESMA Regulation Art. 33.
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Finally, the major and highly contested March 2019 ‘EMIR 2.2’ reform is per-
haps most revealing of the future direction of travel.92 It puts in place a new
regime for enhanced oversight of third country CCPs that are not systemically
important (‘Tier 1 CCPs’), including new information request and fining
powers for ESMA; for the onshore supervision by ESMA of systemically sig-
nificant, or likely to become systemically significant, third country CCPs
(‘Tier 2 CCPs’); and for the relocation to the EU of the most systemically sig-
nificant CCPs – the critical assessment of systemic status is by ESMA.93 These
swingeing reforms reflect significant institutional (including from ESMA94)
and political concern over the lack of EU oversight over third country CCPs,95
but are hard to disentangle from Brexit-related interests in relocating clearing
business from the UK. The relocation reform, in particular, has acute salience
for the UK post-Brexit given its implications for the UK CCPs which domi-
nate in euro-denominated clearing,96 although its global implications for the
clearing industry has led to a firestorm of criticism internationally.97 While the
co-legislators accepted the Commission’s controversial 2017 proposal for an
EU relocation mechanism, they also, however, accepted its less incendiary pro-
posals for more intensive ‘on-shore’ ESMA supervision of Tier 2 CCPs. And it
is these reforms which are the most revealing in terms of the thinking of the
EU on third country access/equivalence; the relocation mechanism is of the
most acute political salience, so is not an entirely reliable indicator of the direc-
tion of travel more generally. The new regime for Tier 2 CCPs certainly pre-
92 Regulation (EU) No 2019/2099 [2019] OJ L322/1.
93 ESMA has recently adopted its advice to the Commission on the Delegated Acts which
will govern how the assessment is carried out:ESMA, Final Technical Advice on Criteria
for Tiering under Article 25(2a) of EMIR 2.2 (2019).
94 ESMA Chair Maijoor repeatedly warned of the dangers of the EU’s deference-based
approach under EMIR to third country CCPs and of the related inability of the EMIR
‘recognition’ system to allow the EU to adequately address the stability risks posed by
third country CCPs: “Keynote Speech”, 23 January 2017.
95 The Commission warned of the risks to the EU from there being no direct involvement
of EU supervisory bodies in the day-to-day supervision of third country CCPs, and of
the imbalance between the EU’s reliance on third country supervisors and third country
regimes’ insistence on direct oversight over third country (including EU) CCPs, parti-
cularly as the EU has the highest number of third country CCP access arrangements as
compared to other jurisdictions internationally:Commission, Impact Assessment for the
2017 CCP/EMIR 2.2 Proposal (SWD(2017)148), pp. 42–43 and p. 45.
96 The relocation proposal received intensive attention in the UK (e.g. 2018 House of
Lords Report (fn. 57), pp. 58–62 and pp. 91–92, acknowledging the EU’s concerns re-
garding the UK ‘off-shoring’ of CCP business but concerned as to risks to the UK).
97 The relocation mechanism has generated significant concern, particularly from the US
financial market. See, e.g., responses by the International Swaps and Dealers Association
(US), ICI Global, and The Vanguard Group, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-reg
ulation/initiatives/com-2017-331/feedback_en?p_id=30988, 14 January 2020.
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sages a more austere and less deferential approach, but there are also liberal
elements.
Under EMIR 2.2, in order to be recognised, Tier 2 CCPs must comply directly
with specific EMIR requirements, at the moment of recognition and on an on-
going basis: the required third country equivalence determination on which
CCP recognition depends does not accordingly suspend the application of a
detailed swathe of EMIR requirements relating to capital, organisational, con-
duct of business, prudential, and interoperability requirements.98 This repre-
sents a significant hardening of the EU’s approach as it leads to the ‘on-shor-
ing’ of Tier 2 CCP regulation and related supervision (by ESMA) alongside the
equivalence determination, and so to a striking move away from the deference
model. ESMA has been conferred with a related extensive, discrete set of direct
supervisory powers over Tier 2 CCPs, including to make information re-
quests, take investigatory actions, engage in on-site inspections, and take en-
forcement action (including the issuing of public notices, the imposition of in-
junctions and fines, and the withdrawal of recognition).99 These operational
supervisory reforms represent a major strengthening of ESMA’s supervisory
powers generally, in a sector of acute economic and political salience, and will
require a very significant re-organisation of its governance arrangement to ac-
commodate the complex decision-making procedures EMIR 2.2 imposes on
ESMA as regards the supervision of Tier 2 CCPs.100 The reforms also represent
a striking extension of the EU’s regulatory reach by applying a swathe of
EMIR’s rules directly. Accordingly, EMIR 2.2 shifts the CCP third country
regime from being one based almost entirely on deference to home/third coun-
try supervision (once the equivalence decision is made and the CCP is ‘recog-
nised’ by ESMA), to an ‘on-shored’ system based on the direct application of
EMIR and much more intensive ESMA supervision and monitoring.
Significantly, however, the reforms accommodate some elements of deference,
and it is in this regard that traces of a more liberal approach, and of a possible
new direction for the future, can be identified. EMIR 2.2 provides that a Tier 2
CCP can be deemed to satisfy the directly applicable EMIR requirements by
complying with the rules and regulations of its third country, as long as ESMA
adopts a finding of “comparable compliance” as regards the relevant third
country rules. A CCP can submit a reasoned request to ESMA asking that
ESMA assess whether its compliance with identified third country rules is
98 EMIR 2.2, Revised EMIR Art. 25(2b)(a), subjecting Tier 2 CCPs to EMIR Art. 16,
Title IV, and Title V.
99 Set out in detail in EMIR 2.2, revised EMIR Art. 25 and newArticles 25a–25q. ESMA’s
powers more-or-less follow the operational/procedural template that governs its direct
supervisory powers over rating agencies (CCRAR) and trade repositories (EMIR).
100 See ESMA, 2020 Annual Work Programme (2019), pp. 13–14.
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deemed to satisfy compliance with the directly applicable EMIR require-
ments101. ESMA’s recently published advice to the Commission for the Dele-
gated Acts to be adopted on the modalities governing comparable compli-
ance102 underlines both the rigour of this assessment – comparable compliance
will not be easily achieved – but also the potential for deference. The compar-
able compliance assessment is clearly to be additional to and more intensive
than the prerequisite jurisdiction-level equivalence assessment. ESMA has af-
firmed that the comparable compliance assessment is undertaken at CCP level,
that it implies a detailed “requirement-by-requirement” analysis of the directly
applicable EMIR rules against the relevant third country rules, that it should
examine the “extent to which” a CCP’s compliance with third country rules
satisfies EMIR, and that any internal CCP rules and procedures that form an
integral part of its legal and supervisory arrangements, being legally binding,
are to be examined also.103 ESMA has also firmly rebuffed the frequently-made
argument from third country CCPs that the Commission’s jurisdiction-level
equivalence assessment suffices for the purposes of comparable compliance.104
At the same time, there are indications of a more liberal approach. The EMIR
2.2 legislative scheme requires ESMA to adopt a proportionate approach, and
ESMA has indicated that the assessment will be outcomes-based and be cali-
brated depending on the type of EMIR rules being assessed. In this regard,
ESMA has proposed to the Commission that the directly applicable EMIR
rules subject to the comparable compliance review be classified as “core” and
“non-core”.105 As regards “core” requirements (ESMA has proposed a highly
detailed and lengthy set of key EMIR rules as “core”), a finding of comparable
compliance can follow, ESMA has proposed, where the third country rules, on
an outcomes basis, are equal or at least as strict as (quantitative requirements)
or conservative (qualitative requirements) as the EMIR rules: rules would
therefore not need to be “literally identical”.106 And where the rules do not
always meet this test, they could still be regarded as comparable where the
CCP voluntarily adopted the relevant EMIR requirements. As regards “non-
core” EMIR requirements, a finding of comparable compliance can follow
where the third country rules can be regarded as a substitute for the EMIR
101 EMIR 2.2, revised EMIR Art 25a.
102 ESMA, Technical Advice on Comparable Compliance under article 25a of EMIR
(ESA70-151-2649)(2019).
103 Ibid, pp.10-11.
104 Reaction from third country CCPs to ESMA’s proposed approach was hostile, but
primarily as regards the new legislative scheme moving away from ‘full deference’.
ESMAwas assertive in noting that it had no jurisdiction to engage with comments call-
ing for legislative revision of EMIR 2.2: ibid, 8.
105 Ibid, pp. 42–43 and pp. 44–46.
106 Ibid, p. 16.
60 Niamh Moloney ECFR 1/2020
requirements in that they achieve the same regulatory objectives, in accordance
with ESMA guidance on how this test can be met. Further, where a finding of
comparable compliance is made, ESMA has indicated that it will “normally
rely” on the cooperation of the third country supervisory authority.107 Finally,
the “core” rules are designed to reflect the scope of the CPMI-IOSCO Princi-
ples for Financial Market Infrastructures, suggesting some ESMA sensitivity
to international convergence in this area. Alongside these indications of an out-
comes-based and proportionate approach, ESMA has also shown itself willing
to address at least some third country CCP concerns, scaling back some of the
provisions included in the “core” classification in response to feedback.108
Much depends on how ESMA applies the new comparable compliance assess-
ment, but it is not unreasonable to suggest that comparable compliance con-
tains the seeds, at least, of a potential means for moderating and calibrating the
‘on-shoring’ of EU requirements being suggested by the current direction of
travel.
3.4 The Political and Institutional Context
That the third country regime has not been radically recast (apart from as re-
gards CCPs) is not a surprise, notwithstanding the Brexit shock. Political and
institutional preferences as regards third country access have long been dy-
namic and divergent, and collective positions have not always been easy to
establish.109
Overall, clashes tend to arise between those Member States open to liberalisa-
tion, and those concerned to limit market access, whether for competitive rea-
sons or because of concerns relating to financial stability.110 Brexit might, how-
ever, have been expected to generate some degree of collective Member State
concern to signal open-ness and the attractiveness of the EU capital market,
and thus some support for the regime to be liberalised. At the same time, there
is much at stake for certain Member States from the reshuffling of UK-based
business and from a more restrictive approach. The most radical reforms, the
EMIR 2.2 reforms, can be associated with the significant and cohesive political
107 Ibid, p. 14.
108 Ibid, p. 18 and pp. 21–22.
109 See, e.g.,Quaglia (fn. 5).
110 Different levels of national market exposure to international financial markets have
been associated with e.g. different perspectives on financial stability: Aneta Spendzhar-
ova, “Banking Union under Construction: the impact of foreign ownership and do-
mestic bank internationalization on EU Member States’ regulatory preferences in
banking supervision”, Review of International Political Economy 21 (2014), 949.
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interests in repatriating clearing activity from the UK to the EU and in build-
ing related national champions,111 although even here there was division be-
tween the Member States.112 Member States’ preferences most usually vary by
sector,113 as is clear from the 2019 ESA Reform Regulation negotiations. For
example, France’s support over the Regulation negotiations for ESMA to be
given more power to restrict NCAs from authorising the delegation of busi-
ness to third counties was met by significant opposition from Member States
who have a competitive advantage in such business (in particular Ireland and
Luxembourg as regards the funds industry), and the delegation power was ul-
timately dropped. The proposed delegation reform was ultimately one of the
most contested elements of the 2017 ESA Reform Proposal, generating con-
cern that it prejudiced NCAs’ autonomy in relation to the authorisation pro-
cess, and so disturbed the pre-eminence of home NCAs as regards authorisa-
tion and in the granting of the single market passport under EU financial mar-
ket legislation.114 By contrast, ESMA’s new equivalence monitoring and review
powers under the 2019 ESA Reform Regulation are materially less salient for
Member States than the proposed delegation reforms, and so it is not unex-
pected that the Commission’s proposals here did not change very significantly
over the negotiations. Nonetheless, the Member States’ concern to protect
their discretion as regards third country relations is clear from the Council’s
more light-touch approach to the administrative agreements to be adopted by
Member States with third countries which ultimately prevailed over the Com-
mission’s earlier more prescriptive approach in the 2017 ESA Reform Propo-
111 France and Germany in particular have, since the Brexit decision, supported the repa-
triation of clearing in euro-denominated instruments to the EU. Shortly after the 2017
adoption by the Commission of its original EMIR 2.2 proposal, France and Germany
called for an even tougher approach: Reuters, Market News, “France wants right to
Veto Euro Clearing in the EU after Brexit – EU Sources”, 6 September 2017. The ma-
jor German CCP (Deutsche Bӧrse’s Eurex Clearing) is regarded as one of the potential
beneficiaries of the new regime, although it has already taken pre-emptive action as
regards clearing. In late 2017, e.g., it offered financial institutions a profit-based incen-
tive to move clearing business to it: Philip Stafford, “Deutsche Bӧrse makes ground in
UK derivatives push”, Financial Times, 5 February 2018.
112 A number of Member States, including Sweden, sought to lighten the relocation me-
chanism: European Scrutiny Committee, House of Commons, Report on EU Supervi-
sion of UK-based central counterparties after Brexit, 17 July 2019.
113 Member States’ different competitive interests in attracting different aspects of relo-
cated UK business became clear early on. Asset management business e.g., and France’s
related efforts to woo business, was an early flashpoint:OwenWalker, “Spooked Fund
Managers look at Rivals to London”, Financial Times, 17 February 2018.
114 Industry concern, particularly from the asset management sector which relies heavily
on delegation arrangements, was acute (Attracta Mooney/Jennifer Thompson, “Eur-
ope’s National Regulators Clash Over Delegation”, Financial Times, 8 October 2017).
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sal, which requiredMember States to notify ESMA in advance of any intention
to conclude such an agreement with a third country and to provide it with
drafts of any agreement. The 2019 Investment Firm Regulation’s revision of
the MiFIR third country regime for investment firms was also contested, re-
flecting the business interests at stake, with some Member States calling for a
yet-more restrictive approach than that adopted.115 Ultimately, much depends
onMember States’ respective competitive advantages in relation to UK-located
and global business, and on whether these are or would be compromised by
any change to the third country regime. It is not surprising therefore that ma-
jor reform has been side-stepped.
Institutionally, theEuropeanParliament has shown some interest in revising the
third country/equivalence regime, but it is wary of theCommission’s role in the
equivalence process and in international financial governance,116 and is likely to
be suspicious of any reformswhich include a strengthening of the Commission.
The inter-institutional negotiations on the equivalence aspects of the 2019 ESA
Reform Regulation, for example, saw the Parliament insert itself, alongside the
Commission, as an institution to which ESMAwas to report on its equivalence
activities. The Commission can be expected to protect (and seek to strengthen)
its institutional pre-eminence over the equivalence process and so to resist any
efforts to lighten the equivalence process. While this is clear from its 2019 and
2017 Equivalence Reports, early 2017 also saw the Commission propose re-
forms to Comitology Regulation 182/2011 which governs equivalence deci-
sion-making117 in order to reduce the number of abstentions on decisions and
ensure the Commission receives stronger political guidance. This reform can be
associated with a Commission concern to bolster itself against ex-post political
risks when making equivalence decisions, as well as to signal its intention to re-
main pre-eminent as regards the procedural design of the process. TheCommis-
sion can also be expected to protect the autonomy of the single rulebook and,
accordingly, to resist any liberalisationof the current regime.But itmight also be
expected to see integration advantages in recalibrating the third country regime
to support CMU and to buttress the single market against post-Brexit stability
115 France supported a significantly more restrictive approach than that adopted, based on
requiring a branch or subsidiary: Samuel Wilkes, “French bombshell would gut MiFIR
equivalence, say lawyers”, Risk.net, 4 June 2018. The ‘on-shoring’ of certain MiFIR
requirements (including the share and derivatives trading obligations), however, re-
flects France’s interests: Speech by AFM Chairman Ophèle, “MiFID II’s Practical Im-
plementation 9 months on and post-Brexit Implications for our future Relationship
with the UK”, 1 October 2018.
116 ECON Committee, Report on the EU Role in the Framework of International Finan-
cial, Monetary and Regulatory Institutions and Bodies (A8-0027/2016), March 2016.
117 COM(2017)85.
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risks: these interests might lead it to support some liberalisation of the regime.
For themoment, however, autonomy and stability interests appear uppermost.
Finally, ESMA’s expanding technocratic influence is relevant. Since the Brexit
decision and over the ESA Review, ESMA has adopted an entrepreneurial pos-
ture, calling for a strengthening of its role,118 and drawing on its experience with
EMIR’s third country CCP regime to argue that the lack of EU-level supervi-
sory control over third country actors exposed the EU to risks. ESMA Chair
Maijoor warned, for example, that the EU was an “island of equivalence” in a
worldwhich demanded supervisory oversight of third country actors.119ESMA
advocacy aside, the institutional vehicle ESMA provides for reform, and the
technical experience it has acquired in this area, can be associatedwith the recent
operational/supervisory reforms. ESMA’s operational capacity can also be ex-
pected to drive future centralisation of the regime. Overall, ESMA has emerged
as the major institutional winner from the recent reforms to the third country
regime. It has acquired significantly greatermonitoring, supervisory, and enfor-
cement powers, and so a firm foothold in what is likely to become an increas-
ingly salient aspect of EU capital market law and policy.
4. A Modest Prescription: Watch, Reflect, and Strengthen Oversight
4.1 Risk Horizons and CMU
The recent reforms do not accordingly suggest a major re-set of the third coun-
try regime. The deference principle is broadly intact, and the EU remains con-
cerned to be open to capital market business from outside the EU.120 None-
theless, that the regime is becoming more prescriptive and ‘on-shored’ seems
clear. As to the implications, there are short-term and long-term horizons.
118 In its response to the Commission’s 2017 ESA Review Consultation, ESMA called for
enhanced supervisory powers and followed up with a call for direct supervisory
powers over third country rating agencies, trade repositories, benchmarks, trading ve-
nues, and data services providers (ESMA, Letter to the Commission, 7 July 2017).
119 ESMA Chair Maijoor also queried in this intervention whether “sufficient assurance”
was available that the risks of third country infrastructures in the EU were adequately
assessed and addressed by the relevant third country regulator (fn. 94).
120 ESMA Chair Maijoor has recently noted that “a deep and vibrant financial market in
Europe can only be built only with an active and direct participation of players from
around the globe (fn. 54), while the Commission has linked enhancing the global at-
tractiveness of the EU capital market to the success of the CMU project and underlined
the importance of the equivalence regime in this regard: Commission, Capital Markets
Union: progress on building a single market for capital for a strong Economic and
Monetary Union (COM(2019)136).
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In the short-term, the third country regime as currently configured and re-
cently reformed may complicate, at least, UK access to the EU market. UK
capital market actors can, of course, use different routes to the EU capital mar-
ket which avoid the third country regime, whether by setting up subsidiaries;
using subsidiaries but repatriating activities back to the UK;121 or using other
techniques such as ‘reverse solicitation.’122 The ECB appears sanguine as to the
risks of an abrupt rupture from the UK capital market, and is primarily con-
cerned with ensuring that the new pools of capital that may develop in the euro
area are efficiently connected and with completion of the CMU agenda.123 The
Commission’s main focus so far has been on securing financial stability, pro-
tecting the autonomy of the single rulebook and the integrity of the single
market, ensuring sustainable liquidity, and avoiding any regional fragmenta-
tion where UK-based business disperses across the EU.124 Nonetheless, there
are material risks in the short-term to the EU from the abrupt excision of a
significant aspect of its capital market into an off-shore jurisdiction.
In the long-term, it is unlikely that the EU will not benefit from a more liberal,
or at least differentiated, approach to third country access to the EU capital
market. The EU’s longstanding concern to embed market finance more deeply
in the bank-based EU financial system, currently being spearheaded by the
CMU project, is a complex one given the structural features of the EU financial
system.125 Despite years of regulatory reform, which can be traced back to the
1999 Financial Service Action Plan, the EU financial system remains bank-
based; further, capital markets in the EU are highly fragmented.126 There is, as
121 ESMAmade clear in a series of summer 2017 opinions, however, that NCAs are not to
authorise subsidiaries where they are shell companies without an appropriate local risk
management capacity. NCAs’ approach to relocation-based authorisations is moni-
tored through ESMA’s Supervisory Convergence Network.
122 Under sectoral EU financial market legislation, services provided in response to a ‘re-
verse solicitation’ (e.g. when a client requests services from an investment firm) are not
usually subject to EU law, although NCAs across the EU can take different approaches
domestically to the extent to which they give local access to such business.
123 Speech by ECB Executive Board Member Couré on “European Capital Markets: prio-
rities and challenges”, 25 June 2019.
124 2019 Commission CMU Report (fn. 120).
125 See, e.g., Manfred Kremer/Alexander Popov, Special Feature A: Financial Develop-
ment, Financial Structure and Growth: Evidence from Europe, in: ECB, Financial In-
tegration in Europe (2018), p. 65 et seq. and Iain Hardie/David Howarth (eds.), Mar-
ket-based Banking and the International Financial Crisis, 2013.
126 See recently ECB, Financial Integration in Europe (2018). Securitisation activity, ven-
ture capital funding, and private placements, e.g., are concentrated across different
groups of Member States: Commission, Staff Working Document, Economic Analysis
Accompanying the Commission Communication on the Mid-Term Review of the Ca-
pital Markets Union Action Plan (SWD(2017)224).
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charted in the Commission’s annual European Financial Stability and Integra-
tion Reports, compelling evidence that market finance has taken a stronger
hold, particularly over the financial crisis period when bank lending was se-
verely compromised. Bond issuances by non-financial corporates, for exam-
ple, doubled over 2008-2014 and by 2016 the Commission was reporting that
a transition to market-based funding was underway.127 But this hold is not se-
cure. The EU remains predominantly a bank-based system.128 ESMA, for ex-
ample, repeatedly reports on the long-term decline in prospectus authorisa-
tions, with 32.6% fewer prospectuses approved in 2018 as against 2007.129
While this is only one indicator and there are many capital market substitutes
to prospectus-based offerings of securities, the Commission’s 2019 European
Financial Stability and Integration Report130 reported on a drop in market fi-
nance activity and also on a halt and some decline in integration levels, and
ESMA has more generally reported on a persistent drop in levels of capital
market funding since early 2015.131
This discussion is not concerned with the viability of, and the optimal elements
of, any agenda to promote market-based funding in the EU; these are highly
complex and contestedquestions.Neither are the implications ofBrexit formar-
ket-based finance in the EU clear. But it can at least be suggested that the EU is
not in a strong position to restrict access by theUKor by leading capitalmarkets
internationally, particularly as funding requirements becomemore complex and
specialised, including as regards sustainable finance. The embedding of market
finance in the EU is all the more a precarious project given some emerging evi-
dence of Member States resisting the integration agenda. As noted above, the
autonomy of the home NCA as regards authorisation of home capital market
actors who can then passport across the EU was threatened by the Commis-
sion’s 2017 proposed reforms to the ESMARegulation as regards the authorisa-
tionprocess for actors planning todelegate their activities.While this reformwas
defeated during the negotiation process, it exposed support in some quarters for
the passporting/integration model which underpins EU capital market regula-
tion to be limited. In another straw in the wind, in summer 2019 the three ESAs
issued a joint report on cross-border supervision of retail financial services
which warned of a lack of clarity as to the respective roles of home and host
NCAs, administrative weaknesses in the passporting system, and, more funda-
127 Commission, European Financial Stability and Integration Review 2016 (SWD(2016)
146).
128 CEPS/EMCI, Rebranding Capital Markets Union. Amarket finance action plan, 2019.
129 ESMA, EEA Prospectus Activity in 2018 (2019).
130 Commission, European Financial Stability and Integration Review 2019 (SWD(2019)
183).
131 ESMA, Report on Trends, Risks and Vulnerabilities, No. 2 (2019).
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mentally, of the potentially limited incentives home supervisors had to supervise
‘exported’ firms and products.132 Finally, while there are no serious indications
that theUKwill engage in anything like a ‘race to the bottom’ in financial regula-
tion (the Bank of England, for example, has been clear as to the importance of
strongprudential standards), there are some straws in thewindas to thepotential
for regulatory competition in some areas which could disrupt the EU market.
The UK Financial Conduct Authority has recently indicated some appetite for
re-visiting the UCITS fund rules, for example, and adopting a more principles-
basedmodel, amovewhich elicited a sharp response fromESMAChairMaijoor
as to the resilience and quality of the EUUCITS regime;133 it also indicated sup-
port more generally for a “same outcome, lower burden” approach to any post-
Brexit trade arrangementwith the EU.134 If theUK seeks to compete by reform-
ing rules in certain sectors, while this is likely to make trade negotiations more
difficult it also means that the EU capital market may struggle to attract and
embedmarket-based funders such as investment funds.
4.2 A Modest Reform Prescription
Considerable uncertainty attends the third country regime. A swathe of impor-
tant reforms has just been adopted and has yet to come into force. How ESMA
will apply its new powers remains to be seen. The impact of Brexit on the EU
capitalmarket and on international capital flows into theEU is not yet clear. The
UK’s approach to future regulatory competition and/or cooperation with the
EU is also not clear. Political and institutional interests are still in flux in the EU,
particularly with a newCommission and European Parliament, andwithMem-
ber States’ interests still being reshuffled as the different implications of Brexit
emerge. It will be some time before a clear picture of the third country context
emerges. Accordingly, the time is not yet ripe for further reform. This is all the
more the case as, if significant market dislocation hits the EU over the next few
years as the UK disentangles itself from the EU, the Commission can always
adopt equivalence/access decisions speedily and unilaterally. This is not to say,
however, that the third country regime should be placed in cold storage awaiting
developments. Twomodest proposals are presented here.
132 ESMA/EBA/EIOPA, Joint Committee Report on Cross-border Supervision of Retail
Financial Services (2019).
133 Chris Flood, “ESMA hits back at FCA’s criticism of fund rules”, Financial Times,
16 September 2019.
134 Cat Rutter, “FCAChief eyes “lower burden” regulation after Brexit”, Financial Times,
23 March 2019.
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First, the seeds of a new and more finessed approach are in the current reforms.
In particular, the tiering and comparable compliance approaches adopted in
and trialled by EMIR 2.2 deserve greater examination. One approach to ac-
cess/equivalence in the future could, for example, be the adoption of a tiered-
system of jurisdictions internationally, with the level of equivalence/oversight
required being calibrated according to the systemic importance of the jurisdic-
tion, but as regards EU market efficiency and depth as well as regards financial
stability. A series of concentric tiers could be established, with the lightest level
of oversight applying to those systems with the closest regulatory and super-
visory identity with the EU. Depending on the tiering (which could be as-
sessed by ESMA and adopted by the Commission, overseen by the Parliament
and Council, in the form of a Delegated Act, given the political interests at
stake), different levels of equivalence assessment and related oversight could
apply, ranging from comparable compliance through to direct ‘on-shoring’ of
regulation and supervision. But before any such change is contemplated, ex-
perience with tiering and comparable compliance is required, and this will
come with EMIR 2.2.
Second, policy attention could usefully focus on ESMA’s oversight arrange-
ments and whether they sufficiently secure appropriate legitimation for ESMA
of its newly-enhanced powers.135 From an effectiveness perspective, ESMA’s
strengthened powers are attractive, particularly as regards ESMA’s enhanced
oversight of third country actors in the EU market; ESMA has already shown
itself to be an agile and purposeful supervisor.136 But there are also legitimacy
risks. Generally, while ESMA’s exercise of its regulatory and direct supervi-
sion/supervisory convergence powers can be regarded as agile, data-informed
and, overall, effective, ESMA’s wide mandate and its purposeful application of
its powers are bringing it closer to the contested grey zone between political/
legislative and administrative action.137 ESMA’s new powers bring it even clo-
ser to this zone given the political salience of the third country regime. Cer-
tainly, the 2019 ESA Reform Regulation strengthens ESMA’s foundational le-
gitimation arrangements in some respects, including by specifying its mandate
in greater detail, requiring additional reporting on and oversight of the extent
135 For a recent comparison of ESMA’s legitimation arrangements against those of the Sin-
gle Supervisory Mechanism, and calling for greater European Parliament oversight of
ESMA, see Elizabeth Howell, “EU Agencification and the Rise of ESMA: Are its gov-
ernance arrangements fit for purpose?”, Cambridge Law Journal, 78 (2019), 324.
136 See further Moloney (fn. 8), ch. five and Elizabeth Howell, “The Evolution of ESMA
and Direct Supervision: Are there implications for EU Supervisory Governance”,
Common Market Law Review 54 (2017), 1027.
137 See generallyMoloney (fn. 8), examining ESMA’s evolution since 2011 and considering
is effectiveness and legitimacy.
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to which ESMA acts proportionately, and imposing new institutional report-
ing obligations. But it does not disturb ESMA’s core internal governance ar-
rangements and in particular the pivotal role played by the decision-making
Board of Supervisors, the voting members of which are exclusively NCAs,
which also doubles as ESMA’s internal accountability forum. This is in many
respects welcome. The Commission’s original 2017 ESA Reform Proposal
provided for a new Executive Board, composed of appointed bureaucratic
members (rather than representative NCAs), which would have been con-
ferred with the supervisory powers and powers to take action against NCAs
previously conferred on the Board of Supervisors, as well as new powers. This
injection of bureaucracy, while designed to make it easier for ESMA to take
decisions in the interests of the EU, particularly against NCAs, carried none-
theless the risk of deepening legitimation risks as it diluted the legitimation
provided by the representative Board of Supervisors. But while the primacy of
the Board was re-asserted over the negotiations, the opportunity was not taken
to consider other internal governance remedies, such as the adoption of some
form of ‘oversight board’, sitting above the Board of Supervisors and provid-
ing strategic advice and mandate challenge; the enhancement of the Board’s
oversight role, including by more intensive Board of Supervisors’ considera-
tion of ESMA decisions through new Board committees; the strengthening of
European Parliament oversight through direct representation; or the dilution
of the significant but opaque influence exercised by the Commission as a non-
voting member of the Board of Supervisors.
ESMA’s burgeoning influence, the conferral on it by the 2019ESAReformReg-
ulation of additional powers (albeit of a moremodest order than originally pro-
posed by theCommission), and the only limited changesmade to its governance
arrangements would in any event have made careful review of ESMA’s internal
and external legitimating arrangements appropriate. But the need is particularly
acute as regards ESMA’s third country powers. ESMA’s enhanced role in mon-
itoring equivalence under the 2019 Investment Firm Regulation and the 2019
ESA Reform Regulation will draw it further into a process which can be ex-
pected to be more politically contested and to expose it to political risks. Legit-
imation risks also arise in relation to the threshold tiering determination by
ESMA under EMIR 2.2 as to the systemic importance of a third country CCP,
given the political and economic implications of any such decision. And while
ESMA’s new supervisory powers over third country investment firms (Invest-
ment FirmRegulation) andCCPs (EMIR2.2) have a compelling logic as regards
the need to protect EU financial stability, they also inject ESMA into direct
supervisory relationships and so increase legitimation risks. This is not to say
that ESMA’s legitimation arrangements are not fit-for-purpose. A matrix of ex-
ternal institutional and judicial reviewprocedures, accountability-relatedCom-
mission, Council and Parliament reporting obligations, mandate constraints,
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procedural dictates (including in administrative rules), budgetary review pro-
cesses, internal structures (including the Board of Supervisors), and constitu-
tional principles all serve to legitimate ESMA’s actions. But the third country
reforms represent a step-change in ESMA’s powers and bring it closer to politi-
cally contested territory. Close attention will be needed to the resilience of its
legitimation arrangements, whether by the European Parliament (perhaps in its
regular Budget Discharge Resolutions) or by the Council, a bodywhich has yet
to assertively exercise its role as one of ESMA’s accountability fora but which
may come to do so given the increasing salience of the third country regime.
5. Conclusion
This article examines the EU’s third country regime at a distinct inflection
point in its development. An important series of legislative reforms, adopted
in March 2019 as the 2014-2019 European Parliament/Commission term
closed, provide a ‘first look’ at how institutional and political interests as re-
gards third country access might be changing given Brexit and the related risk
to the CMU agenda.
So far, it seems that the deference model which has long characterised the third
country regime will remain in place, at least for the medium-term. It is, how-
ever, being diluted by means of more intensive monitoring of equivalence sta-
tus and by the ‘on-shoring’ within the EU of third-country-actor supervision
(through ESMA) and by the direct application of certain EU rules. It is also
clear that there is limited political or institutional appetite for addressing the
procedural and other weaknesses associated with the equivalence process. The
most radical legislative reforms relate to third country CCP access under
EMIR 2.2, where the EU has adopted a significantly more ‘on-shored’ ap-
proach, based on ESMA supervision, albeit that this incursion into the defer-
ence model is tempered by the new ‘comparable compliance’ tool. Overall, the
third country regime is becoming more centralised, more ‘on-shored’ within
the EU, and centralised, with ESMA the major institutional winner from the
recent reforms. While any prediction in this area is fraught with difficulty, this
development may pose risks to the CMU project as the EU capital market
adjusts to the withdrawal of the UK.
The article also examines the second element shaping this inflection point in
the development of the third country regime: the rise of ESMA. In recent
years, ESMA has come to exert material but effective technocratic influence on
the equivalence assessment process. It has also been conferred with a series of
‘gateway’ powers over third country actors; although there is only limited ex-
perience with these just yet, the CCP experience augurs well for the future.
The material strengthening of ESMA’s powers by the March 2019 reforms,
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however, raises questions regarding the resilience of its legitimation arrange-
ments. While a matrix of different legitimation mechanisms supports ESMA,
these may come under increasing pressure as its influence over an increasingly
highly-salient politically aspect of EU financial market policy deepens.
Mindful of the need to allow the current reforms to settle and be tested, a mod-
est reform prescription, based on continued observation, the monitoring and
potential expansion of the comparable compliance tool, and close attention to
the resilience of ESMA’s current legitimation arrangements is offered.
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